Martin K This piece of reflection critically examines the strategic use of development aid by the European Union (EU) as a tool for migration control in its relations with African states. Drawing on a postcolonial theoretical framework and critical discourse analysis, it interrogates how conditionalities embedded in aid agreements redefine the normative purpose of development cooperation. Focusing on the case of Niger, it explores how these mechanisms not only influence migration governance but also reinforce historically entrenched asymmetries between Europe and Africa. Empirical insights are drawn from EU-AU communiqués, European Commission policy documents, and secondary literature, illustrating the shift from needs-based to compliance-based aid. The findings suggest that while effective in curbing short-term migration flows, such strategies undermine African sovereignty, fuel local resentment, and compromise long-term development objectives. The study calls for a paradigm shift toward mutual accountability, regional agency, and respect for mobility rights in EU-Africa relations.
What is the author’s current standpoint on this topic?
The European Union (EU) has historically positioned itself as a global leader in development cooperation, particularly with countries in the Global South. Central to its post-colonial engagement with Africa has been the rhetoric of partnership, capacity building, and mutual prosperity. However, since the so-called migration crisis of 2015, marked by heightened political tensions over irregular arrivals from Africa, this relationship has undergone a significant transformation. Migration governance has become a core pillar of the EU’s external relations, with development aid increasingly repurposed as a tool to enforce migration deterrence policies. The EU’s stated objective of addressing the “root causes of migration” has morphed into an operational strategy of conditioning aid on partner States’ willingness to prevent departures, facilitate returns, and accept externalized border controls.
This instrumentalization of aid raises several fundamental questions about the ethics, efficacy, and long-term sustainability of the EU’s external action. Can development aid still be considered a neutral or benevolent practice when entangled with coercive migration agendas? Does the conditioning of aid in exchange for migration cooperation compromise the political autonomy and sovereignty of African States? To what extent does this shift reflect a deeper, structurally embedded neocolonial logic in EU-Africa relations? These questions form the core of this inquiry, which aims to unpack the evolving nature of aid conditionalities in contemporary migration governance.
The present reflection explores these questions through an interdisciplinary lens, drawing on postcolonial theory, critical migration studies, and international development policy. It posits that the EU’s recalibrated aid agenda not only undermines normative principles of development such as ownership, mutual accountability, and long-term structural investment, but also perpetuates asymmetric power relations reminiscent of colonial administrative logic. While framed under the guise of mutual partnership, aid conditionalities disproportionately serve EU interests, particularly in securitizing its borders and outsourcing migration control responsibilities to African states with limited capacity and advantage.
This piece proceeds by analyzing key policy instruments such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), and bilateral Migration Compacts. These instruments are examined as mechanisms through which the EU embeds conditionalities and transfers the burden of migration control to third countries. Through a case study of Niger, a strategically located but aid-dependent country in the Sahel, this piece of writing offers an empirical illustration of how aid is mobilized to reshape migration flows, reconfigure state behavior, and institutionalize new forms of external governance.
Ultimately, it challenges the current trajectory of EU external migration policy and development cooperation. It argues that the entanglement of aid and migration control undermines both the legitimacy and effectiveness of development programming. Rather than mitigating structural causes of migration, these policies may exacerbate fragility, erode local livelihoods, and deepen mistrust between European and African actors. By foregrounding African sovereignty and mobility rights, our reflection calls for an alternative framework that reorients EU–Africa cooperation toward inclusive, equitable, and sustainable development paradigms.
What does the existing body of scholarly literature and theoretical frameworks suggest about this issue?
This piece draws on an interdisciplinary theoretical framework that combines postcolonial critique, critical migration governance studies, and development theory to examine the reconfiguration of EU-Africa development aid into a mechanism of migration control. At its core, this framework challenges the assumption that international aid flows operate within neutral, technocratic, or benevolent logics. Rather, it foregrounds the structural asymmetries, embedded power relations, and discursive constructions that shape the conditionality-based aid regime in the post-2015 migration governance landscape.
The literature on the migration–development nexus has long been fraught with contestation. Early policy assumptions maintained that increasing development assistance in migrant-sending countries would reduce migratory pressure by addressing the so-called “root causes” of irregular migration, including poverty, unemployment, and political instability. However, empirical research, most notably by Carling (2002) and De Haas (2020), has refuted this claim, demonstrating instead that development often enhances people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate, particularly in the short and medium term. Migration, in this view, is not necessarily a symptom of underdevelopment but often a rational and strategic life choice made possible by increased access to education, income, and networks. The EU’s persistent reliance on a containment logic, despite such evidence, suggests a disconnect between policy rhetoric and migratory realities.
This empirical mismatch is further compounded by the EU’s increasing reliance on aid conditionality as a governance tool. As conceptualized by Lavenex and Kunz (2008), conditionality refers to the use of incentives or penalties, often in the form of financial assistance or diplomatic recognition, to induce behavioral change in recipient countries. In the context of migration governance, this includes expectations that African countries sign return and readmission agreements, strengthen border surveillance infrastructure, or host third-country nationals rejected by the EU. These arrangements are often embedded in broader processes of externalization (Betts, 2011; Van Hear, 2011), whereby responsibilities for controlling migration are shifted outside the EU’s territorial boundaries. Such mechanisms not only expand the EU’s regulatory reach but also insulate it from the human rights obligations associated with asylum procedures within its borders.
The post-2015 policy architecture, including the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), and bilateral Migration Compacts, provides an institutional scaffold for such conditionalities. These tools are justified through discourses of “shared responsibility” and “mutual benefit,” but as several scholars have argued, they are frequently skewed toward EU interests, leaving African states with little genuine policy space (Cassarino, 2007; Gebhart, 2023). Development aid becomes not a platform for addressing structural inequalities but a transactional means of enforcing migration controls.
To interrogate these dynamics further, our reflection draws heavily from postcolonial theory, particularly the works of Edward Said (1978), Frantz Fanon (1961), and Achille Mbembe (2001). Said’s concept of Orientalism is useful in illustrating how Africa is constructed in European discourse as a space of instability, crisis, and disorder requiring external intervention. Fanon’s theorization of colonial governance emphasizes the psychological and institutional residues of domination that continue to shape post-independence relations. Mbembe, meanwhile, introduces the idea of commandement, the imposition of governance structures that preserve colonial modes of rule under new names. In the context of EU-Africa relations, these insights illuminate how development cooperation, framed as partnership, may function as a contemporary modality of control.
Moreover, governmentality, as theorized by Michel Foucault (1977), offers a useful lens to understand how the EU governs not only through law and coercion but also through the production of knowledge, norms, and policy frameworks. Migration is increasingly constructed as a security threat rather than a socio-economic or human phenomenon, and development aid is re-engineered to manage the “risks” associated with African mobility. This securitization of aid aligns with what Bigo (2002) refers to as the “ban-opticon”, a system in which mobility is not universally restricted but selectively controlled, allowing for the circulation of desirable bodies (e.g., skilled labor migrants) while obstructing those deemed undesirable (e.g., economic migrants, asylum seekers).
The ethical implications of this shift have also been the subject of critical debate. Scholars such as Faist (2008) and Betts (2011) argue that using development assistance as a migration control tool undermines the foundational norms of aid effectiveness. namely, ownership, alignment, harmonization, and predictability, as outlined in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). By making aid contingent on restrictive migration outcomes, the EU risks distorting recipient states’ national development agendas and eroding local trust in both domestic and international institutions. Furthermore, NGOs and civil society actors have criticized these practices for diverting resources away from urgent sectors like education, health, and infrastructure into opaque and security-oriented programs (Amnesty International, 2018; Raman et al., 2023).
In sum, the theoretical and empirical literature converges on the idea that current EU development policies in Africa are no longer primarily about reducing poverty or fostering resilience but are increasingly about governing mobility through disciplinary conditionalities. This strategic shift necessitates a critical reassessment of what development cooperation is meant to achieve and for whom. Through the analytical framework articulated above, this reflective paper situates EU aid conditionalities within broader global structures of inequality, coercion, and governance, thereby laying the groundwork for the subsequent case study and empirical analysis of Niger.
Reflection approach
We employed a qualitative, interpretive methodology using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how EU policy documents construct the migration–development nexus. Data sources include official communications from the European Commission (2015–2023), EU-Africa summit reports, and joint press releases. Discourse is analyzed to identify patterns of conditionality, coercion, and hierarchy. Additionally, peer-reviewed literature and policy critiques from NGOs and think tanks have also been consulted. A case study approach is applied to Niger, selected for its geostrategic importance and high aid dependency. The theoretical lens draws on postcolonial thought (Fanon, 1961; Mbembe, 2001) and governmentality (Foucault, 1977), emphasizing how discursive and financial tools govern populations across borders. Limitations include the lack of access to classified negotiation documents and the limited availability of African-authored official responses, a factor that itself reflects the structural imbalance in policy visibility.
What have we found then?
- Aid Conditionalities as Instruments of Control
Following the 2015 migration crisis, the European Union restructured its development aid frameworks to align more directly with migration deterrence objectives. While the EU has long integrated migration into its external relations, the establishment of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) marked a pivotal moment in formalizing migration control as a core aim of aid policy. Official EU documentation frequently references the need to “address the root causes of irregular migration,” a seemingly developmental ambition that in practice has served as a pretext for embedding conditionalities into aid agreements (European Commission, 2016). These conditionalities often tie financial assistance to cooperation on return and readmission agreements, as well as enhanced border management and security reform. This approach departs significantly from the principle of needs-based aid allocation, signaling a transition to what might be termed compliance-based development assistance.
The language of policy documents increasingly reflects a managerial, target-driven approach to development cooperation. Terms like “benchmarks for cooperation,” “progress indicators and performance-based disbursement” are now commonplace in the EU’s external funding architecture (European Commission, 2021). This technocratic vocabulary masks the political reality that recipient countries must adhere to European migration governance standards to access funding. Such practices amount to a form of normative transfer, wherein the EU imposes its priorities and regulatory frameworks onto partner states through financial mechanisms. While this is often justified through the rhetoric of shared goals, it effectively reduces African governments’ room for autonomous decision-making and distorts national development priorities.
In this context, development aid ceases to be an instrument of solidarity or capacity building. Instead, it becomes a geopolitical lever, wielded to induce behavior in line with the EU’s domestic political imperatives. Scholars such as Cassarino (2007) and Lavenex (2015) argue that this strategy constitutes a form of “remote control,” whereby the EU governs migration not only within its borders but also by outsourcing control to third countries through diplomatic and financial inducements. The problematic nature of such arrangements lies not only in their lack of transparency but also in the asymmetry of power they expose. African states, often constrained by economic dependency and fragile institutional contexts, are not negotiating from a position of equality but rather from structural subordination.
- Case Study: Niger and the Criminalization of Mobility
Niger offers a powerful case through which to examine the real-world implications of migration-linked aid conditionalities. Located in the heart of the Sahel, Niger has become a geographical and political linchpin in the EU’s external migration strategy. Following the Valletta Summit of 2015 and the launch of the EUTF, Niger was designated a key partner country. Between 2016 and 2021, the country received over €1 billion in EU development funds, much of which was allocated to border control, security infrastructure, and anti-smuggling programs (Gebhart, 2023). In return, Niger’s government passed Law 2015-036, which criminalized the transport of migrants across its territory, a law widely interpreted as a direct concession to EU policy demands.
While the law was ostensibly aimed at combating human trafficking, its broader consequences were both economically and socially destabilizing. Agadez, a historical hub for regional migration, saw the collapse of entire local economies built around the provision of transport, lodging, and food for migrants. Thousands of people, many of whom were previously operating legally, found themselves criminalized overnight. This shift not only disrupted livelihoods but also pushed migration underground, leading to more dangerous routes through the desert and increasing the risk of abuse, exploitation, and death (Amnesty International, 2018). Rather than curbing irregular migration, the law merely reconfigured its modalities, contributing to what some scholars term the clandestinization of mobility (Röing, 2020).
The human cost of these policies is well documented by humanitarian organizations, which report increased numbers of arbitrary arrests, extortion by security forces, and detention of migrants without due process. Moreover, the repressive apparatus necessary to enforce these measures has often been funded directly by EU development assistance. This creates an ethical paradox: resources intended to promote sustainable development, moreover, human dignity are instead being used to bolster coercive state functions. As Raman et al. (2023) note, such interventions blur the line between development aid and securitized governance, embedding a logic of surveillance and containment into spaces that were previously governed by informal or customary mobility norms.
- Sovereignty, Partnership, or Coercion?
Despite being framed in diplomatic language as “migration partnerships,” EU agreements with African states frequently lack the characteristics of equitable negotiation. Rather than mutual agreement between sovereign actors, these arrangements often reflect the donor-driven nature of conditional aid. African governments, particularly those heavily reliant on external financing, are compelled to acquiesce to EU demands or risk losing access to critical development funding. This dynamic raises serious questions about the erosion of sovereignty and the reassertion of neo-colonial power hierarchies.
Critically, this coercion is often veiled behind discursive strategies of partnership. The EU presents itself as a normative power, committed to human rights, democracy, and development, while employing mechanisms that prioritize European border security over African development needs. The African Union has, on multiple occasions, voiced concerns about the imbalance inherent in such partnerships. This imbalance is further aggravated by the absence of strong African institutional voices in the policy-making process. While EU institutions actively shape conditionality frameworks, African counterparts are often limited to the role of implementers. This lack of policy co-ownership undermines trust and weakens the legitimacy of aid-based cooperation. Postcolonial scholars argue that such arrangements reproduce colonial modes of governance, where decision-making authority remains concentrated in the hands of external actors, and compliance is secured not through consensus but through dependency and duress (Mbembe, 2001; Fanon, 1961).
- Ethical and Strategic Pitfalls
Beyond questions of sovereignty and legitimacy, there are significant ethical and strategic pitfalls associated with the EU’s use of aid for migration control. The reallocation of development resources away from critical sectors such as health, education, and infrastructure toward migration-related security projects contradicts globally endorsed aid effectiveness principles. The Paris Declaration (2005) and subsequent Accra Agenda for Action (2008) emphasized the need for aid to align with recipient priorities, be predictable, and strengthen country systems. Yet migration conditionalities tend to distort this framework, replacing long-term development objectives with short-term political expediency.
The strategic rationale behind migration-linked aid is also questionable. While intended to reduce irregular migration, such policies often have the opposite effect. Restrictive migration policies do not eliminate migration; they redirect it through more dangerous and exploitative channels. As De Haas (2020) and Carling (2002) show, rising incomes and improved education in developing countries typically increase aspirations and capabilities to migrate. The EU’s failure to account for this dynamic reflects a fundamental misreading of migration patterns and determinants.
Furthermore, the entanglement of aid with coercive practices such as forced returns and border militarization can fuel anti-European sentiment in recipient societies. Civil society organizations in Niger, Mali, and elsewhere have criticized EU programs for privileging European interests at the expense of African dignity and autonomy. This growing resentment undermines the soft power legitimacy of the EU and jeopardizes the sustainability of its development interventions. A development model that suppresses local agency, exacerbates socio-economic vulnerabilities, and criminalizes mobility cannot foster the kind of resilient, inclusive growth that development cooperation purports to achieve.
Let us discuss then
The findings outlined in the previous section reveal a structural and conceptual recalibration in the European Union’s approach to development cooperation with African states, one that raises significant normative and policy concerns. While EU institutions continue to portray their development aid as aligned with humanitarian values and mutual interest, the instrumentalization of aid for migration control reveals a deeper logic of conditionality, containment, and coercive governance. This discussion engages with the broader implications of that shift, drawing from the theoretical foundations of postcolonial critique, migration governance, and development ethics.
At a fundamental level, the EU’s reliance on aid conditionalities in migration partnerships represents a securitization of development. By prioritizing border enforcement, return mechanisms, and migration management over socio-economic empowerment, the EU risks distorting the foundational goals of development cooperation, poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and inclusive governance. As De Haas (2020) and Faist (2008) argue, this instrumentalization reflects not only a strategic pivot but also an epistemological shift in how development itself is defined and practiced. No longer a domain of structural transformation or equitable redistribution, aid is increasingly deployed as a regulatory technology, a tool for shaping behaviors, institutions, and policy choices in recipient states toward EU-defined objectives.
This strategic reorientation is also problematic from the standpoint of democratic governance and accountability. Many African governments implement EU-aligned migration policies, such as anti-smuggling laws or readmission procedures, under significant external pressure, often in contradiction with local development priorities or popular sentiment. Such policies are rarely subjected to rigorous public debate or legislative scrutiny within recipient countries. The result is a democratic deficit, wherein domestic policy is shaped more by donor preferences than citizen participation. This calls into question the legitimacy of such partnerships and raises ethical concerns about sovereignty and consent.
Furthermore, the case of Niger illustrates how externally driven migration control frameworks can produce unintended and often counterproductive consequences. Instead of curbing migration, the criminalization of mobility and militarization of borders have increased the risks for migrants and displaced people, forced the migration economy underground, and exacerbated socio-economic grievances in transit regions. These dynamics point to what might be termed a paradox of deterrence: the more the EU seeks to restrict mobility through coercive measures, the more it contributes to instability, precarity, and informalization of migratory routes. This not only undermines the EU’s stated development goals but also contributes to the very drivers of displacement and irregular migration it seeks to prevent.
Importantly, the current approach risks reinforcing colonial hierarchies and imaginaries. As theorized by Said (1978), Fanon (1961), and Mbembe (2001), the colonial encounter was not merely a project of territorial conquest but a system of knowledge production and political control. The contemporary migration-aid nexus echoes these dynamics: African mobility is framed as a threat to European stability; African agency is subordinated to European control; and African development is pursued only insofar as it aligns with European security imperatives. This logic reproduces what some scholars refer to as “postcolonial governmentality” (Latham, 2010), in which the tools of development and diplomacy are repurposed to serve neo-imperial functions under liberal, humanitarian guises.
Moreover, the EU’s migration-linked aid strategy erodes the multilateral principles of global development cooperation. Frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Global Compact for Migration (2018), and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 emphasize inclusive development, respect for human mobility, and shared accountability. However, conditionality-based partnerships violate the spirit—if not the letter—of these frameworks by imposing asymmetrical terms and prioritizing donor interests. As Raman et al. (2023) argue, these arrangements represent “developmental coercion,” in which aid is no longer a right or global duty but a reward for compliance.
That said, the EU is not monolithic, nor are African states merely passive recipients. There is growing contestation within European policy circles, civil society organizations, and African leadership about the sustainability of coercive aid models. EU-based NGOs and watchdogs have increasingly criticized the lack of transparency and ethical oversight in migration partnerships. African civil society actors and some regional institutions have called for a return to African-led development planning, where migration is not treated solely as a problem to be managed but as a socio-economic reality to be governed justly.
This opens the possibility for rethinking EU-Africa cooperation through alternative frameworks. One such approach is the mobility justice paradigm, which views migration as a right and a form of global interconnectedness rather than a security threat. Rooted in principles of freedom of movement, non-discrimination, and decolonial justice, mobility justice calls for policies that enable safe, regular, and voluntary migration rather than suppressing it through force or dependency. Within this framework, development aid would be designed not to deter migration but to expand genuine choices for individuals and communities, whether they wish to stay or move.
Another promising direction is the emphasis on mutual accountability and co-ownership in development programming. Rather than using aid as an advantage, donor-recipient relations should be grounded in jointly defined priorities, transparent decision-making, and long-term structural investment. This would require the EU to decouple migration control from development cooperation and invest in areas that foster resilience, education, green transformation, and democratic governance, sectors that address the root causes of precarity without instrumentalizing people’s movements.
Finally, the EU must reckon with the symbolic and historical weight of its engagement with Africa. A meaningful postcolonial partnership demands more than technocratic cooperation or financial transfers; it demands political humility, historical acknowledgment, and structural change. Only by centering African agency, respecting sovereign decision-making, and embracing a truly horizontal dialogue can EU development aid regain legitimacy and contribute to durable, just, and inclusive development outcomes.
Conclusion
This piece of writing has critically examined the European Union’s increasing use of development aid as a strategic instrument for migration control in its relations with African states. Through the lens of postcolonial theory, migration governance, and critical development studies, it has demonstrated how aid conditionalities, particularly those embedded in Migration Compacts and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, represent a significant shift away from the normative principles of equitable development cooperation. By analyzing key policy documents and the illustrative case of Niger, this study has shown how development aid is being instrumentalized not to reduce poverty or foster resilience, but to externalize European borders and manage African mobility through coercive means.
The implications of this shift are both profound and troubling. In prioritizing short-term migration deterrence over long-term structural investment, the EU undermines the very foundations of its development agenda. Conditionality-based partnerships compromise the sovereignty of African states, destabilize local economies, and erode public trust in both donor institutions and national governments. Furthermore, these arrangements perpetuate a neocolonial dynamic that positions African states as sites of intervention rather than equal partners in global governance. Far from addressing the structural causes of displacement and irregular migration, such strategies risk exacerbating them by deepening dependency, marginalizing local agency, and criminalizing human mobility.
Moreover, the continued reliance on aid as leverage reflects a broader epistemological failure to engage meaningfully with the realities of migration. As the literature on the migration–development nexus demonstrates, increased development does not necessarily reduce emigration in the short term. Instead of recognizing migration as a developmental strategy and social process, the EU has framed it almost exclusively as a problem to be solved, thus constraining the policy imagination and reinforcing exclusionary narratives.
To move beyond this impasse, a fundamental rethinking of EU-Africa relations is required, one grounded in mutual accountability, policy co-ownership, and respect for mobility rights. Development cooperation must be reoriented toward inclusive and transformative goals, decoupled from the logics of border enforcement and coercive conditionality. This requires a commitment not only to structural investment in education, health, and governance but also to creating legal and safe pathways for migration, supporting regional mobility frameworks within Africa, and upholding international commitments to refugee protection and human rights.
In this context, African states and civil society actors must be empowered to shape migration and development agendas in ways that reflect their priorities and values. Equally, the EU must confront the historical legacies and enduring power asymmetries that continue to shape its external action. Only by acknowledging and addressing these imbalances can a genuinely equitable and effective partnership emerge, one that treats mobility not as a threat to be contained, but as a dimension of global interdependence and human aspiration.
In sum, the conditional use of aid in migration governance may offer short-term political dividends for European policymakers, but it comes at the cost of development effectiveness, regional trust, and long-term stability. A sustainable future for EU-Africa relations depends on the courage to reject transactionalism in favor of solidarity, and the vision to reimagine aid not as leverage, but as a commitment to justice and shared human development.
Notes
To develop the arguments presented in this piece of publication, I consulted a wide range of scholarly, institutional, and advocacy publications, each of which provided key conceptual or empirical insights:
- Amnesty International (2018), Human rights violations in Niger’s migration control, documented the consequences of EU-backed anti-smuggling laws in Niger, including arbitrary arrests and the collapse of local economies. This report grounded my case study in evidence of how conditionality-driven migration policies affect human rights and livelihoods.
- Bakewell, O. (2008), ‘Keeping them in their place’: The ambivalent relationship between development and migration in Africa, offered a critical analysis of how development aid is often used to restrict rather than enable mobility. His argument about the contradictory goals of migration–development policy shaped my critique of EU frameworks.
- Betts, A. (2011), Global migration governance, provided a comprehensive understanding of how international actors, including the EU, create transnational regimes to govern migration beyond their borders. This work helped me contextualize aid conditionality as part of a broader externalization strategy.
- De Haas, H. (2020), The myth of invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe, debunked common assumptions about African migration trends, and argued that development often facilitates rather than deters mobility. His empirical findings directly challenged the EU’s “root causes” rationale.
- European Commission (2016), EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Factsheet, and European Commission (2021), New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Progress Report, were instrumental primary sources. These documents outlined how EU funding mechanisms were designed to reward cooperation on return, readmission, and border enforcement.
- Fanon, F. (1961), The Wretched of the Earth, offered a postcolonial critique of structural violence, colonial continuities, and mental subjugation. His insights helped frame my analysis of African agency in the face of European policy dominance.
- Foucault, M. (1977), Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, provided the theoretical concept of governmentality, enabling me to examine how development aid is used to shape governance practices and policy behavior without direct coercion.
- Gebhart, S. (2023), Migration containment and EU aid in the Sahel, analyzed how EU-funded programs reshape governance in migration transit countries. Her field-based research on Niger significantly informed my understanding of aid-driven policy shifts.
- Lavenex, S., & Kunz, R. (2008), The migration–development nexus in EU external relations, introduced a framework for understanding conditionality and policy transfer in EU partnerships. Their work helped unpack how financial tools are used to enforce migration cooperation.
- Mbembe, A. (2001), On the post-colony, explored the symbolic and administrative legacies of colonial rule. His concept of commandment deepened my analysis of how development partnerships perpetuate unequal power structures under the guise of mutual interest.
- Raman, R., Diatta, M., & Hassan, M. (2023), Conditional partnerships and African sovereignty examined how EU migration policy erodes African sovereignty through donor-driven frameworks. Their article directly supported my critique of asymmetrical negotiations and trust deficits.
- Said, E. W. (1978), Orientalism, provided a foundational critique of Western constructions of the non-Western world. His work helped me analyze how African migration is framed in EU policy as a security issue and a civilizational burden.
- Van Hear, N. (2011), Forcing the migration–development nexus, offered a critical perspective on how migration policies are exported to third countries, often without adequate attention to context or unintended consequences. His insights informed my discussion on externalization and its limits.
Together, these publications offered a multi-dimensional foundation, spanning postcolonial theory, migration governance, and empirical policy analysis, that enabled us to critically interrogate the EU’s use of development aid as a migration deterrent and to propose alternative, sovereignty-respecting approaches to international cooperation.
