Martin K In early August 2025, Istanbul became the epicenter of a highly symbolic and strategically layered summit. Bringing together Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Aguila Saleh, the speaker of Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives, the summit promised to chart a new course in Mediterranean diplomacy. What was officially billed as a dialogue on migration cooperation and regional stability was, in reality, a performance of power, regional repositioning, and mutual need.
For some, it was a diplomatic breakthrough. For others, it was a worrying display of transactional politics in which migration control served as a bargaining chip, and human rights became expendable. As an academic trained in Peace and Conflict Studies and International Relations, and one who actively follows humanitarian and migration dynamics, especially in Africa, this summit stood out to me as an instructive moment. It merits close reflection, not only for what was said but for what it reveals about broader trends in migration governance.
Let’s discuss this summit through the following lens: Does the emerging diplomatic triangle between Turkey, Italy, and Libya signal a new era of externalized migration governance, one that trades humanitarian accountability for strategic control in the Mediterranean?
Diplomacy Met Deterrence: What Was at Stake ?
At the surface level, the summit centered on pragmatic objectives: managing irregular migration flows across the Central Mediterranean route, enhancing maritime coordination, and laying the foundations for future cooperation on energy and defense. Nevertheless, the geopolitical subtext ran deeper. Italy, under Meloni’s leadership, is doubling down on the EU’s externalization strategy, a model that seeks to keep migrants out of Europe by engaging transit countries, regardless of their human rights records. This is not new. Since the 2015 migration crisis, European States have increasingly embraced the logic of deterrence through distance. What is striking now is the normalization of this approach, even as abuses in Libya and elsewhere are widely documented.
Turkey, meanwhile, plays a dual role. It is both a host of millions of refugees, primarily Syrians, and a regional broker leveraging its geography and influence for political and economic capital. President Erdoğan has long mastered the art of turning migration control into a diplomatic asset. His presence at the summit, therefore, was more than symbolic; it was strategic.
Libya’s eastern leader, Aguila Saleh, whose government lacks full international recognition, seized the opportunity for visibility and validation. His attendance and Meloni’s diplomatic choreography with him suggested tacit alignment with Libya’s east, at the expense of Tripoli’s UN-backed administration. It also implicitly acknowledged the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime deal, which redefined boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean and has since remained contentious in EU corridors.
Libya: Between Recognition and Repression
Libya’s fragmentation is well known, but the political gamble of endorsing one side over the other carries consequences. The country remains deeply divided between east and west, each side backed by rival foreign interests. Saleh, representing the Tobruk-based parliament, operates within a complex network of militias, tribal politics, and external patrons, including Egypt, Russia, and the UAE. What makes Libya central to Europe’s migration containment strategy is not just its geography but also its vulnerability. Migrants intercepted by the EU-funded Libyan Coast Guard are routinely taken to detention centers that lack oversight, where abuses are not the exception but the norm. UN agencies and NGOs have extensively documented cases of torture, arbitrary detention, forced labor, and sexual violence.
Yet, Europe continues to bolster Libya’s role as a frontline enforcer. The Istanbul summit only reinforced this. That Saleh could be hosted as a legitimate partner just weeks after his administration expelled an EU delegation from Benghazi speaks volumes about the malleability of European principles when political interests are on the line. This selective diplomacy risks reinforcing abusive structures, legitimizing non-inclusive actors, and sidelining the very institutions needed for a unified, rights-based Libyan state.
A Convenient Geography, an Inconvenient Morality
What emerged from the summit was not merely a trilateral understanding but an architecture of “outsourced migration deterrence.” In this model, States like Turkey and Libya are incentivized to stem migration in exchange for funding, recognition, or political support. It is a form of strategic externalization, less about sustainable migration governance and more about offshoring responsibility. The moral dilemma is stark. In prioritizing containment, European States risk becoming complicit in systems of abuse. The Istanbul summit, in many ways, embodied this dilemma. It showcased how migration diplomacy can become divorced from humanitarian considerations and how realpolitik continues to drive regional cooperation.
Even President Erdoğan, often accused of authoritarian tactics, now plays the role of a regional stabilizer in European narratives. This normalization tells us something critical: control, not compassion, has become the currency of Mediterranean diplomacy. This is not to deny the complexity of managing irregular migration or the political pressure leaders face domestically. However, if we accept that repression, fragmentation, and legal ambiguity are acceptable trade-offs, we must also acknowledge the long-term consequences, erosion of international norms, growing refugee precarity, and increased irregularity as legal routes close.
The View from Civil Society: Left Out, Yet Crucial
One of the glaring absences in this summit was the voice of civil society, both international and local. Organizations operating in the Central Mediterranean have repeatedly sounded the alarm over deteriorating conditions at sea and on land. From search-and-rescue NGOs to human rights defenders in Libya, these actors are at the frontlines of humanitarian response but often find themselves criminalized, delegitimized, or ignored. Their exclusion from summits like Istanbul is not accidental; it reflects a trend. State-centric diplomacy has little patience for voices that challenge its assumptions or expose its failures. Yet, without civil society, there is no accountability. No one to monitoring the Libyan Coast Guard’s actions. No one to investigate disappearances. No one to press for humane alternatives to detention. If the EU and its member States are serious about ethical migration management, civil society must be treated not as a threat, but as a necessary partner.
Conclusion: Diplomacy on the Edge
The Istanbul summit marks a moment of clarity and contradiction. On one hand, it reveals the increasing convergence of Mediterranean actors on border control, regional influence, and mutual gain. On the other hand, it lays bare the costs of such convergence, repression, marginalization, and a retreat from international humanitarian norms. This is not just a Mediterranean story. It is a global one. As displacement increases due to conflict, climate change, and economic hardship, the temptation to contain rather than cooperate will only grow. Nevertheless, sustainable migration governance cannot be built on short-term deals, shifting allegiances, or silent complicity. As academics, practitioners, and citizens, we must ask: what kind of migration future is being forged in rooms like the one in Istanbul? Moreover, who gets to decide the terms of that future?
Disclaimer & Methodological Note
This reflective opinion was written in an academic and personal capacity. It is grounded in public reporting, institutional briefings, and migration policy literature. The idea for this post was born out of ongoing interest in the geopolitics of EU-Africa relations, Mediterranean migration governance, and the ethics of externalization.
This post is both a critical reflection and an invitation to engage.
The piece draws inspiration and data from the following sources:
- Reuters (2025). “Turkey, Italy, Libya agree on migration control measures.”
- Anadolu Ajansı (2025). Italy hails Türkiye’s cooperation in managing irregular migration flows
- Xinhua News (2025). On Diplomatic framing of Turkey’s mediation efforts.
- Libya Observer (2025). Reporting on Libya’s internal divisions and the expulsion of the EU delegation.
- Amnesty International (2023). Libya: ‘They have erased the dreams of a generation’ – Human rights violations in detention centers.
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). Reports on externalization, legal pushbacks, and migration control funding.
- UNHCR (2024–2025). Updates on refugee flows, Libyan detention conditions, and search-and-rescue needs in the Central Mediterranean.
